In 2004, Akiyama and Goto proposed an algebraic surface public-key cryptosystem (ASC04) which is based on the hardness of finding sections on fibered algebraic surfaces. In 2007, Uchiyama and Tokunaga gave an efficient attack, which is called the reduction attack, against ASC04 under some condition of a public-key of the scheme. In 2008, Iwami proposed its improved attack. In this paper, we point out a flaw in Iwami's attack and propose a generalized reduction attack. The attack is based on Iwami's attack, and the flaw is fixed. We also discuss our experiments of the attack.
Introduction
In 1994, Shor proved that the integer factorization problem and the discrete logarithm problem can be solved in probabilistic polynomial time by using quantum computers [1] . Thus, once a quantum computer is realized, public-key cryptosystems based on them would not be secure. For this reason, cryptographic schemes which are expected to have resistance against quantum computers have been researched actively [2] . Algebraic surface public-key cryptosystems (ASCs for short) [3, 4] , proposed by Akiyama and Goto, is one of the candidates for such schemes. ASC is based on the hardness of finding sections on fibered algebraic surfaces. This problem is called the section finding problem (SFP for short). SFP is the following problems. (Let k := F p be a finite prime field of p elements.)
Let X(x, y, t) = 0 be an algebraic surface over k, the problem is to find two polynomials u x (t), u y (t) ∈ k [t] such that X(u x (t), u y (t), t) = 0.
Two of the authors, Uchiyama and Tokunaga, proposed an efficient attack, which is called the reduction attack, against the ASC04 (which is the first implementation of ASC proposed in 2004) in 2007 [5] . They make use of some fundamental properties of Gröbner basis. The correctness of the reduction attack can be proven under a certain condition of the leading term of a public-key X(x, y, t) with respect to a monomial order in k [x, y, t] . Moreover, Ivanov and Voloch proposed a socalled trace attack in 2008 [6] . Then, Iwami proposed an improved reduction attack [7] . In this paper, we point out a flaw in Iwami's scheme, and propose a generalized reduction attack against the ASC04. The attack is based on Iwami's attack, and the flaw is fixed by our proposal. The correctness of our proposed attack is proven without any conditions. Moreover, we discuss our experiments of the proposed attack.
ASC04
In this section, we briefly review the ASC04. See [3] for the detail.
Secret-Key
Two different curves D 1 and D 2 parameterized with t in A 3 (k):
Public-Key
• l: an integer satisfying the following condition. deg t X(x, y, t) < l, and l is the minimum degree of a monic irreducible polynomial f (t) ∈ k[t] given for encryption.
• d: an integer satisfying the following condition.
Encryption
Choose a monic irreducible polynomial f (t) ∈ k[t] of degree greater than or equal to l and randomly choose 
Decryption
, we obtain:
Factorize h 1 (t) − h 2 (t) and choose f (t) as an irreducible polynomial with largest degree. Then, m(t) is obtained by dividing h 1 (t) by f (t). Finally, we obtain the plaintext m from m(t).
Reduction attack

In 2007, Uchiyama and Tokunaga proposed an efficient attack, which is called the reduction attack, against the ASC04 [5] . (See Table 1 .) They make use of fundamental properties of Gröbner basis. For the proof of its correctness, the following condition is assumed:
Condition 1 For the defining equation of the algebraic surface X, the leading term of X as LT(X) w.r.t. a monomial order in k[x, y, t] is in the form of cx
α y β (c ∈ k, (α, β) ̸ = (0, 0)).
Iwami's reduction attack
In 2008, Iwami generalized the reduction attack [7] , and claimed Condition 1 can be dropped.
We implemented the attack. However we could not obtain the valid plaintexts. So there is a flaw in Iwami's scheme. See [7] for the detail.
Proposition 2 In Iwami's attack, we have n = 0 in
Step 5. [x, y] . Thus, we obtain as follows:
, we obtain n = r = 0 ∈ k in Step 5. Thus, we cannot obtain the valid plaintext m.
(QED) 
Output: Plaintext m corresponding to ciphertext F (x, y, t). 
Assume the public-key X ∈ k(t)[x, y], and compute
Y := X/LC(X). (Y ∈ k(t)[x, y], LC(X) ∈ k[t]) 2. Find the remainder R 1 ∈ k(t)[x, y] by dividing F by Y . 3. Randomly choose some terms of R 1 with c ij (t)x i y j ((i, j) (0, 0), c ij (t) ̸ ∈ k),6. Let n(t) = n k−1 t k−1 + · · · + n 1 t + n 0 ∈ k[t], and compute m = n 0 ||n 1 || · · · ||n k−1 .
Generalized reduction attack
In this section, we propose a generalized reduction attack (GRA for short). This attack is based on Iwami's attack, and the flaw is fixed. See Table 2 .
Analysis of the generalized reduction attack
We can prove the correctness of the generalized reduction attack without using Condition 1 based on the following two theorems.
Theorem 3 In Step 4 of our attack,
Then, each term of m(t) + f (t)R 2 can not be divided by LT(Y ). Therefore, we obtain R 1 = m(t) + f (t)R 2 by the uniqueness of R 1 . Now, we assume R 2 = R 2 (t) ∈ k(t). Then, we evaluate the cipher polynomial F at sections D 1 and D 2 , we obtain:
Similarly, we have s(v x (t), v y (t), t) = R 2 . Thus, we obtain:
Therefore, we cannot decrypt because of h 1 (t) = h 2 (t), and this is a contradiction.
in the numerator of R 2 and R 1 (= m(t)+f (t)R 2 ). Then, we randomly choose some terms of R 1 satisfying Step 3, and change them to equivalent fractions with a common denominator. Let the numerators be a set C. Since any element of C can be divided by f (t), we obtain f (t) ∈ G.
(QED)
Note:
In what follows, we use f instead of g since we can obtain f (t) = g (∈ G) by Theorem 3.
Theorem 4 n(t) in Step 5 is the plaintext polynomial m(t).
Proof Let an ideal I be I := ⟨X, f ⟩, and let a Gröbner basis for I be GB(I) 
Now, we will prove f i1 (t) = f (t). First, we shall prove
Then, substitute the secret-key (x, y, t) = (u x (t), u y (t), t) into f i1 , and we have: (Note that X(u x (t), u y (t), t) = 0)
We assumeb(t) := b(u x (t), u y (t), t), and we obtain:
Secondly, we shall prove that f (t) is divisible by f i1 (t). Since f ∈ I ∩ k[t], f i1 is a Gröbner basis. Then, we have:
Therefore, we have:
Thus, we obtain
. Since we compute a Gröbner basis for an ideal I w.r.t. the lex order (x > y > t) in k[x, y, t], we have:
Then, we shall consider about dividing the cipher text F = m(t) + sf + Xr by GB(I). Any terms of the m(t) ∈ k[t] can not be divided by LT(f i ) (2 ≤ i ≤ s).
Furthermore, any terms of the m(t) ∈ k[t] can not be divided by LT(f ) because of deg m(t) = l − 1 and deg f (t) = l. Since sf + Xr ∈ I, sf + Xr is divisible by
GB(I).
Thus, by the uniqueness of the reminder of dividing by Gröbner basis, the reminder of dividing the cipher text F by GB(I) makes m(t).
(QED) Table 3 . Improved generalized reduction attack.
Output: Plaintext m corresponding to ciphertext F (x, y, t).
Assume the public-key X ∈ k(t)[x, y], and compute
, changing its coefficients c ij (t) to equivalent fractions with a common denominator, and let the numerators be C (⊂ k[t] ). 4. Factorize elements of a set C, and let the set of irreducible factors of degree greater than or equal to l be G (⊂ k[t] ). 5. Choose g ∈ G, and compute a normal form n of F by {g, X} w.r.t. the lex order (x > y > t) in k [x, y, t] . If the remainder n is a univariate polynomial n(t) ∈ k[t], go to Step 7.
Otherwise go to Step 6. 6. Choose g ∈ G, and compute a Gröbner basis for an ideal ⟨g, X⟩ w.r.t. the lex order (
By Theorems 3 and 4, we can prove that this algorithm is effective for ASC04.
Efficiency of the generalized reduction attack
When we implement the GRA, since it takes many times to compute a Gröbner basis, the GRA is not so efficient in many cases. From a practical point of view, we need to reduce its running time. Here we propose some improved methods for the GRA by adding some step just before Step 5 in the Table 3 . We call this attack IGRA for short. See Table 3 for the detail.
If
Step 5, then the n(t) is a plaintext polynomial m(t). We have the following theorem.
Theorem 5 If a normal form of F by {f, X} w.r.t. lex order is a univariate polynomial n(t) ∈ k[t] in Step 5 of Table 3, n(t) is the plaintext polynomial m(t) for ASC04.
Proof Let an ideal I be I := ⟨X, f ⟩, and let a Gröbner basis for I be GB(I) := {f 1 , . . . , f s }. As shown at the proof of Theorem 4,
Therefore, we can assume 0) ). By Theorem 4, since we can obtain the valid plaintext polynomial m(t) by dividing the ciphertext F (x, y, t) by GB(I), we have:
Moreover, we can obtain a univariate polynomial n(t) by a normal form of F by {f, X}, and we have:
Therefore, we compute difference of the both members, and we obtain: (Note that 
). Therefore, we obtain:
By Theorem 5, we do not need to compute a Gröbner basis if n(t) ∈ k[t], and we can find a plaintext m efficiently.
Implementation
In this section, we will show some experimental results about the GRA (Table 2 ) and the IGRA (Table 3) . We used a system of Solaris10 with 2GHz CPU (AMD Opteron246), 4GB memory, and 160GB hard disk. Moreover, we used Magma [8] Table 4 for the results. We could efficiently find the valid plaintext m for larger size parameters. The above results of the IGRA could compute m(t) ∈ k[t] at Step 5. Thus, we do not need to compute a Gröbner basis at Step 6. Here we note that, there exist some cases we need
Step 6.
(b) GRA v.s. IGRA We compared with the GRA and the IGRA. As stated in the previous section, it takes many times to compute a Gröbner basis generally in the GRA. Actually, there exist some parameters, which take more than several hours to compute a Gröbner basis in the GRA. Now, we show some experimental results. See Table 5 for the results. In Table 5 , for IGRA, the average running time is shown. Here, we generate randomly 100 sets (X, f, s, r, m) for p = 17, d = 5, l = 60. On the other hand, for GRA, the fastest running time in the experiments is only shown since its running time was too long, and we had to terminate the program before finished in most cases.
Conclusion
We proposed a generalized reduction attack against ASC04, and the flaw in Iwami's attack was fixed by our proposal. Also we showed some experimental results about our proposed attack. One of our future works is to evaluate the computational complexity of the generalized reduction attack according to [9] which is an attack against ASC09, where the ASC09 is an another implementation of the ASC [4, 10] .
